RECENT CASES.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SALE OF TICKETS-REGULATON

By

STATES.-The

defendant, convicted of selling steamship tickets without a license in violation
of the Act of i919, P. L. ioo3, Pa. Stat. i9-o, Sec. 2oz97, amended by the
Act of 1921, P. L. 997, Pa. Stat. Supp. 1924, Sec. 2o197, appealed on the ground
that the statute contravened the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution.
Hld: The statute is unconstitutional, Com. -,.
Disanto, 85 Pa. Super. 149
(1925).

It is fundamental that a Siate, through its police power, has a right to.
require of its citizens whatever qualifications it sees fit to impose as a prerequisite to doing business in the State. It is, however, well settled that a
state law is unconstitutional and void which required a party to take out a
license for carrying on interstate or foreign commerce. McCall v. California,
136 U. S. io4 (1889) ; Crutcher -,.Ky., 141 U. S. 47 (189o) ; Adams Express
Co. V. N. Y., 232 U. S. 14 (1914).
The present statute expressly excludes railroads and steamship companies
from its provisions, and is aimed solely at the independent dealer in such
tickets, who is usually financially unreliable and too often unscrupulous in his
dealings. In the principal case, the majority of the Court looks on such a
dealer as an agent of each of the companies which he represents and holds that,
since the company is engaged in foreign commerce, he, as agent, is also engaged
in such commerce so that the license requirement is a burden on foreign commerce and void under the Constitution, Article 1, Sec. 8, cL. 3. It would seem
that his relation with the various companies is hardly that of an agent. He is
in no sense an employee; his position more nearly resembles that of an independent broker who is selling a particular kind of wares, i. r..
tickets furnished
by the various companies.
The Supreme Court of the United States has upheld many state statutes
which, in so far as they affect transactions of interstate or foreign commerce,
did so indirectly. Thus statutes requiring the examination and licensing of
locomotive engineers have been upheld; N. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Ala., 128 U. S.
96 (1888) ; forbidding the running of freight trains within the state on Sunday;
Hnnington t,.
Georgia, 163 U. S. 299 (1896) ; heating of steam passenger cars;

N. Y.. N. H. & H. R. R. v. N. Y., 16s U. S. 6a8 (1897).

The Act of 1919, if it affects foreign commerce at all, does so only indirectly and might have been upheld.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FOURTEENTu AMENDMENT-ZONING

ORDINANCFS-

RAcEs.-Ordinance and statutes provided for segregation of
the residences of whites and negroes by precisely the same restrictions upon
each. Ordinance So37 of New Orleans, enacted under the authority of La. Acts
1912, No. 117; La. Acts 1924, No. i 8, Held: Ordinance and Statutes constitutional. Tyler t.Harmon, 1o4 So. -oo (La. 1925).
A municipality exercising its police power under express authority of the
legislature may restrict the use of private property in the public interest;
SEGREGATION OF
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Slaughterhouse Cases. 16 Wall. 62 (U. S., 1873); Taunton v. Taylor, 116 Mass.
254 (1874) ; I DiLx.o. Mx. CoaR., Sec. 144 and note; but the restriction must
be reasonable, in good faith, and for a public good. See Plessy v. Ferguson,
z63 U. S. 537, 55o (896); I Dua.ox M'v. CoRP., Sees. 319, 322 and note. It
must not discriminate against some and favor others. See Tick Wo v. Hopkins,
it8 U. S. 356, 368 (i886). In determination di reasonableness, courts consider the necessity of the object sought. Commonwealth z'. Iorchester,3 Pick.
462 (Mass, 1826) ; Kneedler v. Norristown, ioo Pa. 368 (1882) ; I DILLON
MUx. Coin., Sec. 327. Gauged by these standards, segregation of the races,
as provided in the ordinance under review, is permissible under the police
power. Plessy %,.Ferguson, supra. Segregation has been upheld as to schools;
People z: Gallagher,93 N. Y. 438 (1883) ; Roberts -. City of Boston, s Cush.
x98 (Mass., 1849), and as to railroad trains. .11cCabe z. Atchinson, 235 U. S.
1.51 (1914) ; Plessy v. Ferguson, supra.

The judgment in the principal case can not be reconciled with all that is
said in Buchanan 2. IVarley, 245 U. S. 6o (1917), yet the two cases may bd
distinguished. In the latter case the court found as a fact that the ordinance
forbade a white person to sell his property, which was situated in a white
neighborhood, to a colored person. Upon that finding of interference with the
freedom of contract, the court declared the ordinance in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Buchanan -u. Varley, supra, p. 73. In the principal
case the Court found nothing in the statutes or ordinances that forbade a white
person to cell his property to a colored person; and held that the ordinance
merely denied the purchaser of the property the right to reside therein contrary
to the provisions of the ordinance, Tyler -,.Harmon, supra, p. 2o6.
It is not now an open question that a restriction on the enjoyment of one's
property for the public good is not a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment,
Barbier -'. C'onnolly, 113 U. S. 27, 31 (1885) ; Hopkins a,. Richmond, 117 Va.
692, 86 S. E. 139 (1915). The decision in the principal case seems to be in

accord with public policy.
CRIMINAL PROCEnUnREAITHDRAWAL OF PLEA OF GtILTY AFTM JuDGwExT.-Defendant was indicted for murder and arraigned without counsel.
He pleaded guilty, and was sentenced to death. Counsel subsequently appearing
for him filed a motion to vacate the judgment and for leave to withdraw the
plea and enter not guilty. Motion was overruled. Held: Error. Ho-wington ti.
State, 235 Pac. 931 (Okla. Crim. App., 1925).
It is discretionary with the trial court before judgment or sentence to
permit a plea of guilty to be withdrawn for the purpose of interposing not
guilty. Rex -.. Plummer, 11902] 2 K. B. 339; Billingsley '. United States, 249
Fed. 331 (C. C. A., 1918). So, too, in general, of the withdrawal of not guilty
and substitution of guilty. State a,.Shanley. .38 N. Va.516, 18 S. E. 734 (893) ;
People v. Kaiser, i5o App. Div. 54i, 135 N. Y. Supp. 27-4, affirmed in 2o6 N. Y.
46, 99 N. E. 195 (1912) ; State -.- Ferranto, x48 N. E. 362 (Ohio, 1925). The
present case, in which the appellate court viewed the defendant's plea as not
knowingly and voluntarily entered because he was not informed of his constitutional rights, would fall within the prevailing rule that a reversal is proper
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where there has been a clear abuse of discretion. Myers :. State, ziS Ind. 554
18 N. E. 42 (888) ; State v. Maresca, 85 Conn. 3o9, 83 Ad. 635 (1912). -After
judgment a number of decisions have allowed the withdrawal of guilty, treating
the discretion of the trial court as continuing. Sanders v. State, 85 Ind. 318
(1882) ; State ii. Maresca, supra; People v. By.-on, 267 Ill. 498, 1o8 N. E.
685 (tg9S). Contra: Regina v. Sell, 9 Car. & P. 346 (Eng., z84o); Beatty v.
Roberts, 125 Iowa 61g, 1o N. V. 462 (1904). "%Vhle the English rule would
appear the more logical as indicating that the final determination of the court
removes its discretionary power, it would seem that Howeingon v. State, supra,
is in harmony with the desire of our law to throw the greatest protection around
human life which is consistent with sound policy.
EASEME.NTs--RIGHT OF VA" By NEcESSITY.-Plaintiff and defendant own
adjoining properties, acquired from a common grantor. One outlet from
plaintiff's property is a road over defendant's land; the only other is an
adjacent thoroughfare twelve feet above lcvIc of plaintiff's property. Defendant
offers to build plaintiff a driveway to this thoroughfare. Plaintiff, alleging
road over defendant's land is way of necessity, seeks injunction to restrain
defendant's blocking it. Held: Preliminary injunction granted. Lederer v.
Gun Hill Construction Co., N. Y. Supreme Ct., July 3o, t925.
By the weight of authority there is no way of necessity if there be another
exit, however steep, narrow or expensive. United States t,. Rindge, 2o8 Fed.
6xix (D. C., 1913) ; Outerbridge t'. Phelps, 58 How. Pr. 77, 45 N. Y. Super. Ct.
555 (1879) ; McDonald z. Lindall, 3 Rawle 492 (Pa., 1827). By the minority
rule one is entitled to a way by necessity though another eit is possible of
which the expense or difficulty of construction is out of proportion to the value

of the dominant tenement.

Smith -'. Griffin, 14 Colo. 429, 23 Pac. 95 (i8go);

Pettlingill -'. Porter,9o Mass. z (1864). The previous cases stress the element
of necessity and do not permit mere convenience to be substituted. United
States v. Rindge, supra; Nichols v. Lnce, 24 Pick. 1o2 (Mass., 1834) ; and
Littlefield -,. Hubbard, 128 At. 285 (Me., 1925), in which no way was granted
although the only other exit was over the ocean.
The instant case therefore seems to go too far. A road built at defendant's
expense would appear to be practicable and useful for all purposes, although
too steep to be convenient. But to allow a way by necessity, for mere convenience, would too much curtail the right of a freeholder to-the uninterrupted
enjoyment of his land, a right of which our law is a very jealous guardian.
EVWE.NCE-PAROL EVIDENCE RULE I-, PENxsyLvAxxA.-An important
change in the application of the parol evidence rule in this state is indicated by

the decisions in certain recent cases, notably. Gianni -.. Russell & Co.,

28z

Pa.

320, 1-6 At. 79r (1924). An article by Earl G. Harrison, Esq., dealing with
this question, will appear in the next issue of the L.ow REvw.
GARNIST.MENT-EFFECT OF PRIOR AssIax.tIENT.-A assigned a debt to C
without notice to the debtor B. Subsequently D, a creditor of A, obtained a

judgment against B, as garnishee. After this judgment had been entered C
notified B of tie assignment and C and B petitioned the court to strike out
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the judgment and to let C intervene as claimant. Held: The judgment ordered
stricken out. McDowell v. Hopfild, z28 At. 742 (Md., i925).
By the great weight of authority the garnished debtor must be notified of
the assignment of the debt in time for him to state it as garnishee; otherwise
the attaching creditor has priority and the debtor may plead the judgment as a
defense to an action by the assignee. Coates z,. Emporia Bank, 91 N. Y. 2o
(1883) ; DRAKE, ArrAM.NTS, 608 (7th ed.). In re Phillips, 2o5 Pa. 525, 55
At. 216 (i9o3). There has been some relaxation of this rule, however. Where
the garnishee has left judgment go by default and by statute still has an
opportunity to show cause why execution should not issue, notice any time
before execution has been held to be sufficient to protect the assignee. McPhail
& Co. v. Hyatt, 2-9 Iowa 137 (i87o). And if the chose in action is represented
by a written instrument, e. g., a bond or note, many courts require no notice
at all and compel the debtor garnishee to demand the surrender of such instrument or an indemnity bond, at his peril, before submitting to judgment. Yocum
v. White. 36 Iowa 288 (1873)- Sheeler it. Oregon, 65 N. C. 2ot (187t). Of
course, where the garnishee is considered a mere witness and no personal judgment can be rendered against him, but only a court order to pay the attaching
creditor, notice any time before actual payment is sufficient. Millegan v. Plymouth State Bank, 26 Ohio C. C. 1.36 (i9o4). But where, as in most states,
the judgment against a garnishee is final and binding and subject to execution
very little authority supports striking it out upon notice of the assignment,
after final entry. Such a judgment has been stricken out, as in the principal
case, on the ground that notice of the assignment was required only to protect
the debtor garnishee and that as between the assignee and the attaching creditor
the superior equities were with the former. McDonald v. Kneeland, 5 Minn.
352 (186i). But it seems that when such a judgment has the same status as any
other judgment it should stand or fall by the same legal principles and, though
the result may entail some hardship, that the proper remedy, if any, is with
the legislature.
HusBAx AND WIFE-ANXULMENT OF MARRIAGE FOR CONCEALME.xT OF
PRIoR INsAN rY.-The defendant had been incarcerated in an insane asylum
prior to marriage, but was subsequently discharged as cured, and married three
years later. Insanity returned following birth of a child. Defendant had not
disclosed fact she had previously been adjudged insane, nor did plaintiff make
any inquiry about insanity. Held: Not sufficient grounds for annulment of the
marriage. Robertson v. Roth, -o4 N. V. 329 (Minn., 1925).
The court said it was against the policy of the state to permit a ready
annulment of this "extraordinary contractual relation" and that "concealment
in order to annul a marriage must go to the very essence of the contract." The
fraud contemplated by the statute providing for annulment must be something
which destroys the contract or creates an unforeseen condition at the time of
marriage which is "intolerable to society and detrimental to the marriage
relation."
This case follows the weight of authority. Cummington z,. Belcherto,n.
149 Mass. 223, 21 N. E. 435 (889), on similar facts is in accord. Insanity
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occurring after marriage is not grounds for annulment. Lewis v. Lewis, 44
Minn. 124, 46 N. W. 323 (i8o) ; 26 Cyc. 9o3.
New York in its lower courts, at least, appears to hold the contrary. Weill
v. JVcill, 1o4 Misc. 561, 172 N. Y. Supp. 589 (siq8), adopts the rule that if the
facts on which the alleged fraud is based had been known there would have
been no marriage, such facts are material and furnish grounds for annulment.
This rule is iterated in Truiano v. Truiano, 121 Misc. 635, 201 N. Y. Supp. 573
(1923). In accord with these cases is Gatto v. Gatto, 79 N. H. 177, io6 Atl. 493
(1919), where annulment was decreed because the wife had represented herself
as chaste and later revealed incest. Under the Act of 1913, P. L. 1013, Pa. St. 1920, Sec. 14566, Pennsylvania
provides that no license to marry shall be issued where either of the contracting
parties is a person of unsound mind. The Act of 1905, P. L. 211, Pa. St. 92o,
Sec. 9148, which amended the Act of 1843, P. L. 233, Pa. St. 1920, Sec. 9147,
allows a divorce, not an annulment, from an insane spouse. Consequently the
question would not arise in that state.
oF REIEo.-The plaintiff
HuSiAND AXD WIEr-INJuNcT.O -ScoPE
obtained an injunction restraining the defendant from associating or communicating with the plaintiff's husband and from annoying the plaintiff by her attentions to plaintiff's husband. Defendait appealed. Held: Injunction properly
granted. Smnith v,.Womnack, 271 S. W. 29 (Texas, 1925).
It is now settled law that a wife may maintain a damage action for the
alienation of her husband's affections. Westlake v. Westlake, 34 Ohio 621
(1878) ; Bennett t. Bennett, ii6 N. Y. 584, 23 N. E. 17 (1889) ; Gernerd v.
Gernerd, 185 Pa.233, 39 At. 884 (1898) ; 21 Cyc. 1617. But courts are not so
unanimous in permitting her to enjoin another from interfering with her right
to those affections. The courts of Texas and New York have recognized the
power of equity to so restrain one interfering with the marital relation. Ex
parte lVarfieid, 40 Tex. Cr. 413, 50 S. V. 933 (1899) ; Hall v. Smith, 80 Misc.
85, 14o N. Y. Supp. 796 (1913); JVitte v.Bauderer, 255 S. W. ioi6 (Tex.,
1923). See 72 U. oF P. L REV. 451; 37 HA st. L REv. 770. But a recent Ohio
case holds the granting of such an injunction an unwarranted extension of
equity jurisdiction. Snedaker v. King, III Ohio 225, r45 N. E. 15 (1924).
The value of the Texas cases as authority is lessened by the fact that by
statute the courts of that state have wider powers of grantini injunctions than
courts have under the general equity doctrine. Pound, Equitable Relief against
Defamation and Injury to Personality,29 HARv. L. REv. 640, 67_It is generally held that an injunction will issue to restrain third persons
from inducing the breach of a lawful contract by one of the parties thereto,
where it will result in irreparable injury. Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S.33 (1915) ;
HIitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S.229 (1917) ; Duplex Printing
Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S.443 (i92o); American Steel Foundries v. TriCity Central Trades Council, 257 U. S.184 (1921). While these cases concern
the right of an employer to enjoy the fruits of his contract with his employees,
the right of a wife to her husband's affections by virtue of the marriage contract can scarcely be considered less worthy of protection.
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MORTGAGES -

CHATTE'-.LfORTGAGES -

ATTACH.%!ENT -

PRIORITY -

RE. OVAL

STAT-Mortgagor removed a mortgaged automobile from Kentucky,
where, the mortgage was duly recorded, to West Virginia, where plaintiff
secured an attachment lien against the automobile. 1Hcld: The chattel mortFROM

gage takes precedence over the subsequently acquired attachment lien. Ashland
Finance Co. v. Dudley, 127 S. E. 33 (W. Va., 1925).
In directly overruling Ballard z. Great Western Co., 39 IV. Va. 394, i9 S.

E. 5io (1894), the Court brings itself in accord with the majority view, that, by
virtue of the doctrine of comity. when a chattel mortgage is valid and effective
according to the lex loci contractus such mortgage will be regarded as valid in

-the state into which the chattel is removed, as against an innocent purchaser for

value provided that the lex situs of the chattel is not contravened thereby. National Liv'e Stock Bank v. Geneseo First National Bank, 203 U. S. 296 (Igo6) ;
Creelman Lumber Co. v. Lesh, 73 Ark. i6, 83 S. W. 32o (x9o4); Nichols v.

Mase, 94 N. Y. i6o (1883).

Some jurisdictions qualify this rule to the extent of holding that where

the mortgagee has consented to the removal he is not entitled to the amenities
of comity, but must protect his rights by complying with the laws of the state
to which the chattel has been removed, which are designed to preserve those
rights. Farmers and Merchants State Bank v. Sutherlin, 93 Neb. 707, 141
N. NV. 827 (1913) ; Ncwsum v. Hoffman, 124 Tenn. 369, 137 S. NV. 490 (1911) ;
Jones v. North Pacific Fish Co., 42 Wash. 332, 84 Pac. i=a (19o6). Other
jurisdictions regard the consent of the mortgagee to the removal, or knowledge
thereof, as immaterial. Shapard v. Hynes, io4 Fed. 449 (igoo); Handley v.
Harris,48 Kan. 6o6, 29 Pac. 1145 (i89z) ; Cobb v. BushWell, 37 Vt. 337 (1864).
Texas and Michigan refuse to give effect to the principle of comity in
enforcing foreign chattel mortgages when to do so would cause injury to citizens
of those States. Corbett v. Littlcfield, 84 Mich. 30, 47 N. IV. 581 (89o); Best
v. Farmers,etc., Bank, 141 S. W.'334 (Tex. Civ. App., i91i).
The policy of Pennsylvania makes impossible the recognition of secret
liens. Into this category fall chattel mortgages recorded in a foreign state,
though not in Pennsylvania, and hence the exercise of comity in these cases
is prohibited. Sherman State Bank v. Carr, iS Pa. Super. 346 (i9oo) ; Arinitage v. SPahn, 4 Pa. D. R. 27o (1895).
The rule of the minority, although founded in good logic and strict law,
would seem to be the less satisfactory of the two, since it is eminently desirable
that rights acquired under the laws of one state should be upheld in other
states so far as is practicable under their laws.

PUm.Lc

FUNDS-ILLEGAL

DixSBURSEMENT-RIGHT -OF TAXPAYER

TO SuE

FoR REcovEY.-Six taxpayers brought suit against the printer of ballots to
recover for the benefit of the county an amount paid him in excess of the legal
charge, the county commissioners having refused to institute such action. Held:
An individual taxpayer has no right to sue in behalf of the county for funds
illegally paid out. Clark v. George, 236 Pac. 643 (Kan., 1925).
The weight of authority is opposed to this decision. An analogy is found
in the case of private corporations: Burns v. Essling, x54 Minn. 3o4, 191 N. W.
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899 (1923); Quaw v. Paff, 98 Wis. 586, 74 N. W. 369 (1898); and it is held
good public policy to encourage efforts of citizens to compel strict observance
on the part of public officers of their duties. Mills ,. Lantrip, 17o Ky. 8t, 18S
S. 11r . 514 (x916). It would seem that when the proper authorities wrongfully,
refuse to act, the taxpayer has no remedy, and would be at the mercy of dishonest officials. Zuelly v. Casper. i6o Ind. 455, 67 N. E. io3 (19o3) ; Land Co.
-z. .frmntyre, 0ooWis. 245, 75 N. IV. 964 (1898). See also DxLLON, MuNiciPAL
CoRMoRTxoNs, Sees. 158o, 1588.

The Kansas courts rely on the county commissioners to protect the
interests of the county, and if they fail the remedy is to be found in the next
election, or they may be prosecuted on criminal charges, or removed in civil
proceedings, and the moneys recovered by their successors. Craft v. Jackson,
5 Kan. 518 (I87o); Kerby v. Clay County, 7z Kan. 683, 8 Pac. 5o3 (t9O5).
The doctrine is supported by a very few cases in other jurisdictions. Those
courts seem to fear a multiplicity of suits which might be brought by persons
similarly situated: Sears %.James, 47 Ore. 5o, 82 Pac. 14 (9o5) ; and hold that
the county alone has a right to complain. Stevens v. Campbell, 26 Tex. Ciw.
App. 213, 63 S. V. 161 (191o). The injury has been done, and the necessity
for an immediate remedy, the usual ground for an injunction, does not exist.
Eaton v. Thayer, 128 At. 47$ (Me., 925) ; Brownfield v. Houser, 30 Ore. 534,
49 Pac. 843 (1897).
In several states, including Pennsylvania, actions by taxpayers are provided
for by statute. Knight v. Village of Thompsonville, 74 I1. App. 55o; Hick v.
Eggleston, zo5 App. Div. 73, 93 N. Y. Supp. M9 (0go5); Act of 1878, P. L
2o8, Pa. St. 1920, Sec. 6477.
ScnooLs-RIGHT To PUNISH PUPIL--AsSAULT AND BA-aRv.-School principal mildly chastised plaintiff, a pupil, who, while on his own home property
annoyed girl pupils trespassing over it on their way home. Held: No assault
and battery. O'Rourke v. Walker, 128 Ad. 25 (Conn., z925).
Public schools have the right to make reasonable rules for the conduct

of pupils.

Wilson v. Board of Education, 233 IlL 464, 83 N. E. 697 (t9o8);

Jones v. Cody, 132 Mic. 13, 92 N. V. 495 (19o2). For violation of such rules,
the teacher, "in loco parentis," may chastise reasonably, whether the act is committed in school; 3Mansell v. Griffin [igo8J i K. B. i6o; Vanvactor v. State, 113
Ind. 26, iS N. E. 341 (1887); State v. Randall, 79 Mo.-App. 226 (z898);
out of school; Kincer v. Directors,etc., 129 Iowa 441, 1o5 N. W. 686 (19o6) ;
Deskins v. Gose, 85 Mo. 485 (1885) ; or at home. Burdick v. Babcock, 31 Iowa
562 (i87o) ; Commonwealth v. Seed, 5 Clark 78 (Pa., i85i) ; Bolding v. State,
23 Tex. App. 172, 4 S. IV. 579 (1887).

But here there vas no violation of rules, but independent misconduct. Few
cases of this type have arisen. In State v. Pendergrass, 19 N. C. 365 (1837),
the misconduct took place in school; in Cleary v. Booth, [18931 1 Q. B. 465 on
the way to school. Considering the cases where the misconduct took place
after the pupil had returned home after school, none are direct authority for
the present decision. Morrison v. Lawrence, j86 Mass. 456, 72 N. E. 9t (x9o4),
and People v. School Board, 135 Wis. 619, zx6 N. W. 232 (19o8), are cases

zoo
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where the pupil published in town newspapers burlesques on the school; and
In Lander 2. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114 (1859), the pupil insulted the teacher.in public.
These are acts directly injurious to the schooL
The instant case goes farther than any of these, since the plaintiff here
was annoying trespassers on his own property, and the effect on the school was
indirect and remote. The Court justifies its decision by quoting Lander v.
Seaver, supra, but this case is a considerable enlargement of that rule. It is
perhaps not justified by it, but can be explained by the tendency in modern
education to increase the authority of the teacher and protect him in the proper

exercise of that authority.
SET-oFF-DEFEn-SE ix AcTioN By STATE.-The State of New York sued
for a breach of contract The defendants set up a counterclaim, to which the
State objected. Held: The counterclaim was, in effect, a suit against the State
without its consent and therefore was not allowed as a defense. People v.
Greylock Co., 209 N. Y. Supp. 735 (1925).
This case, though in accord with the general weight of authority; People
v. Miles, 56 Cal. .oi (i88o) ; People v,. Dennison, 84 N. Y. 272 (188i); Coin,11onwz'calth 2. Matlack, 4 DalI. 303 (Pa., i8o4); only partly adjudicates the
rights of the parties before the court. While requiring the defendant to pay
the State in full, it leaves his claim against the State to be settled separately.
In support of the view it can be said only that it is the one which follows
logically from the position that a State, being sovereign, cannot be sued
without its consent
A more practical and satisfactory solution of .le problem is found in the
view, held by a few States and the Federal courts, which allows the counterclaim to be used as a defense, on the ground that the State, by bringing suit,
has subjected itself to the rules of court, one of which is that the defendant
may use the counterclaim as a defense. Powers t.. Central Bank, x8 Ga. 658
(1855) ; Brundage v. Knox, 279 Ill. 450, 477, 117 X. E. 123 (1917) ; Commonwealth v. Barker, 126 Ky. 2oo, w03 S. W. 3o3 (19o7). The policy of the Federal
courts rests upon the interpretation of an Act of Congress. x Stat. 514, U. S.
Comp. Stat, Sec. 957; United States v. Wilkins, 6 Wheat. 135 (U. S., 1821) ;
United States v. Eckford, 6 Wall. 484 (U. S., 1867) ; The Gloria, 286 Fed. z88
(D. C., 1923). In this way all the claims which each party has against the
other may be settled in one suit, the defendant not being required to pay more
than a settlement of accounts shows that he should. However, even in these
jurisdictions, the defendant may only reduce the amount of damages claimed
by the Government An affirmative judgment against the Sovereign cannot
be given. Reedside -v. WValker, ii How. 272 (U. S., i85o).
TORTS--JOINDER oF ToRT-FE,.SORs.-Four independent mine owners combined in building dams to impound debris from their mines and in securing
releases from liability from riparian land owners. Plaintiff sued them jointly
and recovered damages. On appeal, defendants raised objection of misjoinder
of defendants. Held: The defendants were properly joined. Bunker Hill
Mining Co. z,. Polak, Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, Aug. 24, 1925.
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The courts are at variance on the right to join tort-feasors in nuisance or
in pollution cases where there is no concurrence in doing the acts, but only in
the injurious results of those acts. Some hold that there is joint and several
liability. Kansas City -. Slangtsroin. 53 Kan. 431, 36 Pac. 706 ( I84) ; Pickerill
Sonie hold there is
2,. City of Loiis.,ilk, 125 Ky. 213, 100 S. W. 873 UY0o).
no joint liability. .Millerz-. 1ij:I:h!,d !)itch Co.. 87 C.al. .130, 25 Pac. 550 (891) ;
Little Schuylkill Xau ;.aion C'. ;. Ri,'hards,. 57 Pa. i.!2 (iS68). Others agree
with this where the i'iury . a r mote con:cqu.-ice, but Say there is joint
liability where the injury re.nlts immediately or ;:rectly irom the coincident and
contemporaneous wrongiul acts.
VJiins.n:
ChIpn:.i', 43 V. Va. 639, 28 S. F.
744 (197) ; i:,uIky z. CIT.,tal Co0l Co., ;5 W. Va. 595, 102 S. E. -65 (1920).
Other courts allow such joint liability only when the results of the acts concur
in creating a public nuisance. City of I 'alpariso z, MoIfitt, 12 Ind. App. 250,
39 N. E. 909 (1894) ; Simmons T,.EVrson, 124 N. Y. 319, 26 N. E. 911 (i89i).
The instant case turns on the conclusion that the combining of tie defendarts in an attempt to minimize possible injury and avoid liability showed sufficient concert of action and common design for their separate acts to be considered joint torts. It seems that this is a convenient rather than a logical
solution.
TRUSTS-ClARiTALE TR'STs-PaoRoTION OF SPoRTs.-A testator bequeathed two sums to form the nucleus of a fund for his regiment "for the
promotion of sport (including in that term only shooting, fishing, cricket, football and polo)." A summons was taken to determine the validity of the legacies.
Held: The legacies were charitable gifts. In re Gray, [1925] Ch. 362.
The promotion of physical efficiency, as well as mental efficiency, is an
educational purpose. In re .llariette [1915], 2 Ch. 284. And any gift which
improves the efficiency of the army is charitable within the meaning of the
Charitable Trusts Act, 43 Eliz. c. 4. (i6Om).
It re Good [xgo5], 2 Ch. 6o.
The precise question whether the promotion of sport, per se, is a charitable
purpose has seldom arisen in England and has never been decided in this country. A bequest to create interest in a single sport (yachting), though beneficial
to the public, is not charitable. In re Nottage [i895], 2 Ch. 649. But a fund
to establish a prize for shooting was upheld. In re Stephens [i892], NV. N.
140 (Eng.).
A gift devoted to "proper forms of entertainment" for members
of a lodge is not charitable.
iason -. Perry. 22 R. 1. 475 (igor) ; and it seems
that a trust to erect a building for dancing and other- amusements, open to the
public, is invalid. Gibson -. Frye Institute, 137 Tenn. 452, 460, 193 S. ,W. io59,
1o62 (j16). But although the primary intention of the donor in making the
gift is to amuse or entertain, if it will advance charitable purposes the gift is
none the less valid. Gibson 2%Frye Institute, supra. That is to say, if the
practical effect of the gift is to make the sport the means, and not the end, the
purpose is charitable. This appears to be the basic principle in the foregoing
cases and the instant case is substantially in accord.
TRUSTS-TESTAMETARY DiSTRxntTIoN-EFFEcT OF HLECTIox.-An estate
was left in trust during life of widow, annuities to be paid to her and other
designated beneficiaries. If the wife refused to accept provisions of will, two
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provisions in favor of her relatives were to be annulled. At expiration of
trust, estate was to be distributed to designated parties, or if any deceased, then
to issue. Widow refused to take under the will. Held: Widow's election did
not consummate trust as to others and did not accelerate the distribution of the
estate. Reighard'sEstate, 283 Pa. 140, x28 At. 84.7 (i92S).
The court relied on three contentions in support of its decision.
The general rule is that the election of the widow to take against the will
of the husband is equivalent to her death, and bequests to those in remainder
become due and payable as if she were actually dead. Ferguson's Estate, 138
Pa. 2o8, 2o At. 94. (i8go) ; Vance's Estate, x4i Pa. 201, 21 At. 643 (i9i) ;
Woodburn's Estate, 15I Pa. 586, 25 At. 145 (1892). There are, however,
exceptions, depending upon the expressed or clearly implied contrary intent of
the testator, such as the provision for other trusts in the will besides those for
the widow, as here. Ferguson's Estate, supra; Disston's Estate, 257 Pa. 537,
xoi AtL 8o4 (1917); V3ylluer's Estate, 65 Pa. Super. 396 (1917).
If all the parties who are or possibly might be interested in the property,
being sui juris, ask for the determination of the trust, it will be decreed. Smith
v. Harrington, 4 Allen 56 6 (Mass., 1862); Culbertson's Appeal, 76 Pa. 145
(1874). But here the shares of the designated beneficiaries, if they die prior
to the period of distribution, will vest in the issue. Hence all persons who
might possibly be interested cannot be said to have petitioned for the determination of the trust.
Finally. since the testator had provided for certain results to ensue from
the wife's failure to take under his will, it is fair to assume that had he intended
other results to follow in that contingency he would have said so.
These three outstanding characteristics of the will clearly show that this
decision is in accord with the law as formulated in Harrar'sEstate, 244 Pa.
542, 91 At. 503 (1914); Disston's Estate, supra; Bruntrager's Estate, 2 Pa.
D. & C. 747 (1922).

